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Abstract. Richard Cox [1] set the axiomatic foundations of probable inference and the algebra 
of propositions. He showed that consistency within these axioms requires certain rules for 
updating belief. In this paper we use the analogy between probability and utility introduced in 
[2] to propose an axiomatic foundation for utility inference and the algebra of preferences. We 
show that consistency within these axioms requires certain rules for updating preference. We 
discuss a class of utility functions that stems from the axioms of utility inference and show that 
this class is the basic building block for any general multiattribute utility function. We use this 
class of utility functions together with the algebra of preferences to construct utility functions 
represented by logical operations on the attributes.  
INTRODUCTION  
It was for long doubted if there are principles of probable inference that are valid 
over the different schools of probability. Venn posed many such doubts in his book 
“Logic Of Choice”. The following is an example taken from Venn’s book. 
“In every case in which we extend our inferences by Induction or Analogy or 
depending upon the witness of others, or trust to our own memory of the past, or come 
to a conclusion through conflicting arguments, or even make a long and complicated 
deduction by mathematics or logic, we have a result of which we can scarcely feel as 
certain as of the premises from which it was obtained. In all these cases then we are 
conscious of varying quantities of belief, but are the laws to which belief is produced 
and varied the same? If they cannot be reduced to one harmonious scheme, if in fact 
they can be reduced to nothing but a number of different schemes each with its own 
body of laws and rules, then it is vain to endeavour to force them into one science.” 
Richard Cox [1] sought to answer Venn’s criticism. Building on the algebra of 
propositions, he proposed two axioms of probable inference, which led to the 
conclusion that the rules by which belief is updated can in fact be reduced to one 
harmonious scheme. Cox thought of probability as a degree of belief, and showed that 
Bayes’ rule provides a unique non-trivial method of inference for his axioms. Cox 
thereby answered Venn’s criticism.  
In this paper we start with a related question about the algebra of preferences and 
the rules of utility inference. In every case in which we extend our preferences over 
the attributes of a given situation, we are conscious of our preference over each of the 
individual attributes and assign a utility function over each attribute. Given varying 
degrees of some attributes, are the laws by which preference is varied over the 
remaining attributes the same?” This question asks if there is a notion of utility 
inference analogous to probability inference. Is there a logical way in which 
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preference is assigned and updated over some attributes when we are guaranteed 
certain amounts of the others? Do we have a unifying method to express our 
preferences in terms of logical operators of attributes and, furthermore, to update 
preferences? This paper attempts to answer these question and presents the algebra of 
preferences, and an axiomatic derivation for the notion of utility inference that 
parallel’s Cox’s axiomatic derivation for probable inference. 
 Let us first provide some notation and algebra for describing prospects of a 
decision situation, in terms of their attributes (which may be single or multiple).  
ALGEBRA AND NOTATION 
In this section we present the notation and algebra needed to describe prospects of a 
decision situation in terms of the attributes involved. Let us start with the case of a 
prospect with a single attribute, X. For example, the single attribute may be money, 
ambient temperature, humidity, or market share of a company. We assume that the 
prospects are ordered such that minX is a least preferred prospect and maxX is most 
preferred at a given state of preference, Ψ .  
The state of preference, , summarizes our background state, knowledge, and 
preference for the attributes at a given epoch in time. 
Ψ
Ψ can change by receiving 
information about some of the attributes, receiving varying degrees of some attributes, 
or even as time passes by. For example our risk aversion for money may change with 
age or with wealth, our preferences for a skydiving experience may change with age, 
and our preferences for flying small planes may change if we receive information 
about their accident rates.  
Utility assignment produces a higher utility value for prospects that are more 
preferred at a given state of preference, Ψ . Thus if the prospects are ordered in a 
ranked list, the utility assignment is a transformation from a preference order to a 
cardinal utility value which is a real number.  
We note that the assignment of a single real number for the utility value of each 
prospect does not go without descriptive controversy. By representing preferences 
with a single real number, we are implicitly assuming that the preferences of any two 
prospects are comparable. For example, given two prospects, AX and BX , and a state 
of preference, , either Ψ AX and BX , are equally preferred, or one is preferred to the 
other. This also leaves no grounds for uncertainty about utility values: if a range of 
utility values is assigned to a single prospect, it may result in overlap with a range of 
utility values for a less preferred prospect and hence we become “money pumps” (we 
would choose prospect AX  over prospect BX , but also prospect BX  over prospect 
AX , and be willing to pay money to move from one prospect to the other). In an 
analogy with probability, Jaynes [3] argued for universal comparability of the 
plausibility of propositions.  In this case we also argue for universal comparability of 
the preference of prospects.  
For any two prospects, AX and BX , in a ranked list, we thus have  
 
                          (1) | | ( | ) ( |A B A BX X U X U XΨ Ψ⇒ Ψ >; )Ψ
 2
where the operator , ; , means “is strictly preferred to”. 
 
The preference ordering relation and its correspondence with the assigned utility 
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FIGURE 1. Utility assignment for ordered prospects.  
 
In figure 1, the symbol bX refers to a certain value of a prospect on the ranked list. 
We will refer to the prospects included between min and bX X as the domain of bX , 
bX∆ . This domain defines a set of prospects bounded by min and bX X . For shorthand, 
we will now refer to the domain bX∆  as simply bX . We also refer to the prospects 
that do not lie in the domain bX  as the complement of bX , and will give it the 
notation bX∼ . The complement of bX  is thus a domain of prospects included in the 
domain of max and bX X . The complement of a domain of prospects defines the 
remaining prospects that are not included in its domain.  
Note that if we are indifferent between two prospects, then they have the same 
order on the ranked list and, as a consequence, have the same domain. They also have 
the same utility value assigned to them. Conversely, any two prospects that have the 
same domain will have the same preference order and the same utility values.  
Note also that the complement of the complement of a domain of prospects is thus 
equal to the domain itself. I.e. 
 
 b bX X=∼∼                                                 (2) 
Since bX dominates all other prospects in its domain we will refer to the difference 
as the maximum utility increment of the prospects in the domain of min( )bU X − (U X )
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bX , and describe it using the shorthand notation U X . The higher the value of 
, the more preferred is the prospect 
( )b
( b )U X bX  and the further it is on the list from the 
worst prospect, minX . Similarly, we will refer to the difference U X as 
the maximum utility increment of prospects in the complement of 
max( ) ( bU X−
b
)
X , and describe it 
using the notation U . The higher the value of U , the less preferred is the 
prospect 
( )bX∼ (∼ )bX
bX  and the further it is on the list from the best prospect, maxX . 
)b
x | )Ψ −
( X
( )bX∼





Ψ = ∼ Ψ
( , )X Y
min max[ , ]X X X∈
ax )
miY Y maxY ]∈
minX Y ) max( ,
THE FIRST AXIOM: COMPLEMENTARITY 
Now we are ready for the first axiom of utility inference, which we state as follows.  
The utility increment of a domain of a prospect, U X , at a given state of preference, 
should tell us about the utility increment of its complementary domain, U , at 
the same state of preference. In other words, as the utility value of a prospect gets 
higher, we would like it to tell us the degree by which the prospect gets further from 
the worst prospect in the domain and, at the same time, the degree by which it gets 
closer to the best prospect. 
(
This can be written in mathematical form for a one-attribute prospect as 
 
              (3) min ma( | ) ( (b bU X X XΨ =
where is a continuous monotonic function. 
 
We can write equation (3) in more concise form as:  
 
 ( [ )bU X S U                                (4) ]b
The utility increment of a prospect at a given state of preference determines the 
utility increment of its complement given the same state of preference. This axiom 
also applies to prospects, which have more than one attribute (as we shall discuss in 
the next section). 
PROSPECTS WITH MULTIPLE ATTRIBUTES 
So far we have focused on prospects with one attribute. We can now extend our 
analysis further and consider prospects of a decision situation that have multiple 
attributes. Let us start with the case of two attributes. We will use the term to 
represent a prospect that has two attributes, X  and Y , where and 
. Our analysis will refer to situations where we can order the attributes 




Furthermore we will assume that the values of ( , )X Y are arranged such that for any 
0 1 0, , , 1X X Y Y
1 0 (
 we have 
1 0 (X X> ⇒ Y> ⇒
X
bX
max. and b Y
 
1 0 1 0, ) | ( , ) | ,  and , ) | ( , ) | ,  X Y X Y Y Y X Y X Y XΨ Ψ ∀ Ψ Ψ ∀; ; (5) 
We consider a prospect in the two-attribute case as the conjunction of two values, 
one for each of the attributes, using the notation, .b cY ; to represent level b of 
attribute X and level c of attribute Y.  
When only one level of an attribute is specified in the multiattribute case, we 
assume all other attributes are set at their maximum values.  I.e. in the two-attribute 






















Figure 2. One-attribute specification in the two-attribute case. 
 
By the construction of equation (5), the top right corner of any rectangular region 
dominates the remaining prospects in that region at a given state of preference. The 
maximum utility increment over this region thus refers to the difference in utility 
values between the top-right prospect and the bottom-left prospect. If the utility value 
of the bottom-left prospect is set equal to zero, then the utility increment is in fact 
equal to the utility value of the top-right prospect.  
The Conjunction Operation 
The conjunction operation is the intersection of the domain of two prospects. For 
example, the conjunction of two prospects max cX X Y  is the shaded region 






























The conjunction of two attributes and bX Y  forms a prospect that guarantees level 
bX of attribute X and level Y  of attribute Y . We can express our preferences as the 
conjunction of two attributes using the framework: “we are interested in 
c
 AND X Y ”. 
This means we are interested in both of them jointly. . For example, one might say, 
“my values are family AND career”. One of the attributes alone will not suffice no 
matter what level it is set to.  
We note that the conjunction of two attributes forms a symmetric relationship, 
since it is merely a description of the level of each of the attributes of the prospect or 
of the values of the decision maker. For example, consider the case of two attributes, 
revenue AND market share that may describe values of a company. We can describe 
the prospect by stating the revenue first and then the market share, or we can describe 
the same prospect by stating its market share first, then the revenue. The order of the 
description is thus irrelevant and the conjunction of two attributes forms a symmetric 
relationship, which we write as  
 
 . .b c c bX Y Y X=                                                  (6) 
Since the order of the conjunction relations is immaterial, then parentheses are also 
unnecessary in describing the prospects. From this result we can write for three 
attributes 
 
 ( . ). .( . ) . .b c d b c d b c dX Y Z X Y Z X Y Z= =                                  (7) 
Equation (7) demonstrates the associativity of the conjunction of three attributes. 
As we shall see later, this property has important consequences for the utility function 
of the conjunction of attributes. It is also clear that the expression .b bX X  describes the 
prospect by a statement about the attribute bX and that the statement is repeated twice. 
For example, a prospect defined by revenue equal to $ 3 million, and revenue equal to 
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$ 3 million (repeated twice) is the prospect of revenue equal to $ 3 million. Based on 
this, the conjunction of an attribute with itself produces the same attribute  
 
 .b b bX X X=                                                   (8) 
The Disjunction Operation 
The disjunction operation is the union of the domain of two prospects. We will give 
this new domain the notation 
 
b cX Y∨                                            (9) 
We can express our preferences as the disjunction of two attributes using the 
framework: “we are interested in OR X Y ”. For example, let us consider that a 
company is interested in the net present value of profit. The attributes involved are 
profit in the first year of operation and the discounted profit in the second year. The 
utility of the company for the net present value is derived from either attribute 
individually or from both of them together. In other words, our preference for the net 
present value is the same for equal values of net present value whether it comes all 
from the first year’s profit, all from the second year’s profit or a mixture of profit in 
both years that yields the same net present value. The disjunction operator implies the 
inclusive OR meaning of the attributes and allows us to choose the “rectangular” 
domain we prefer. Figure 4 shows the domain described by the disjunction of the two 

















Figure 4. Domain of bX Y∨ obtained from the disjunction of max max. and b cX Y X Y
b
 
The disjunction of two attributes is a symmetric relation since it is the same 
prospect but described in a different order. We can thus write 
 
b c cX Y Y X∨ = ∨                                          (10) 
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Similarly, the disjunction of three attributes is associative,  
 
( ) ( )b c d b c d b c dX Y Z X Y Z X Y Z∨ ∨ = ∨ ∨ = ∨ ∨               (11) 
Finally, the disjunction of an attribute with itself yields the same attribute, 
 
 b b bX X X∨ =                                                   (12) 
 
THE ALGEBRA OF PREFERENCES 
Let us now consider prospects that are formed by more than just the conjunction or 
disjunction of two attributes. This enables us to express more complex values in terms 
of logical operations of the attributes. For example, let us discuss the complement of a 
domain of two conjoined attributes. I.e. we want the domain of ( . )b cX Y∼ , which is the 
non-shaded regions in figure 3 (the areas A, B, and C). Note that this domain can be 
obtained by the disjunction of ( )b cX Y∨∼ ∼
~ b
. The region defined by the two areas A 
and B represents the attribute X , and the region defined by the areas B and C 
represents the attribute . From the equivalence of domains, we have the identity ~ cY
 
 ( . ) (b c b c )X Y X Y= ∨∼ ∼ ∼
]∼
c
                                  (13) 
As we have discussed earlier, equivalence in domains of prospects implies 
equivalence in the maximum utility increments across their domains. For example, we 
can now write our first axiom of utility inference for the conjunction of two attributes 
as:  
 
          (14) ( . | ) [ ( ( . ) | )] [ (( ) | )b c b c b cU X Y S U X Y S U X YΨ = Ψ = ∨ Ψ∼ ∼
We can also verify De Morgan’s inequality for attributes using the shaded areas to 
verify that the domain of the prospects of each side are equivalent 
 
 ( ) .b c bX Y X∨ =∼ ∼ Y∼                                 (15) 
The algebra of preferences presents us with a new framework for expressing our 
values. For example, a company may be interested in the motivation of its employees 
AND in maximizing its profit AND in not having lay-offs; alternatively, it may be 
interested in the motivation of its employees AND in not having lay-offs OR in 
maximizing its profit. As we shall see, each of these statements will produce a 
different multiattribute utility function.  
We summarize our expressions for the algebra of preferences and provide more 
identities that can be verified using their equivalent domains in table 1. Note that the 
two equations in each row are the duals to each other and can be obtained by replacing 
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. .b c c bX Y Y X= b c c bX Y Y X∨ = ∨
( . )b c b cX Y X Y= ∨∼ ∼ ∼ ( ) .b c b cX Y X Y∨ =∼ ∼ ∼
( . ). .( . ) . .b c a b c a b c aX Y Z X Y Z X Y Z= = ( ) ( )b c a b c a b c aX Y Z X Y Z X Y Z∨ ∨ = ∨ ∨ = ∨ ∨
.b b bX X X= b b bX X X∨ =
( ). ( . ) ( . )b c a b a c aX Y Z X Z Y Z∨ = ∨ ( . ) ( ).( )b c a b a c aX Y Z X Z Y Z∨ = ∨ ∨
( ).b c b bX Y X X∨ = ( . )b c b bX Y X X∨ =
( ).b b c cX X Y Y∨ =∼ ( . )b b c cX X Y Y∨ =∼
b b c b bX X Y X X∨ ∨ = ∨∼ ∼ . . .b b c b bX X Y X X=∼ ∼








Table 1. The algebra of preferences. 
Now we are ready for our second axiom of utility inference. 
THE SECOND AXIOM: CONJUNCTION 
The second axiom relates the utility of the conjunction of two attributes to the 
utility and conditional utility functions of the individual attributes. It can be stated as 
follows: the maximum utility increment of the domain of two conjoined attributes is 
determined by their separate utility increments; one on the given state of preferences, 
and the other on this state of preferences with the additional assumption that the 
increment in the first is guaranteed. The intuitive rationale for this axiom is as follows. 
If we have a prospect .b cX Y , then it is necessary that we have level bX  of attribute X . 
Thus the utility U X should be involved. If in addition, we also have level Y of 
attribute Y , then the utility U Y is also needed. Alternatively, we can think that 
it is necessary that we have level Y  of attribute Y . Thus the utility U Y should be 
involved. If in addition, we also have level 
( )b c
( | )c bX
c ( )c
bX of attribute X , then the utility 
is also needed.  ( |bU X )cY
 




( . | ) [ ( | ), ( | , )]
                      [ ( | ), ( | , )]
b c b c b
c b c
U X Y F U X U Y X
F U Y U X Y
Ψ = Ψ Ψ
= Ψ Ψ                        (16) 
where is a continuous monotonic function. F
 
We note that some forms of multiattribute utility functions may generalize this 
second axiom, where the utility functions U X  and U Y  may be scaled by 
some functions of x and y. In this case, the second axiom can be generalized into 




( . | ) [ ( ) ( | ) ( ), ( ) ( | , ) ( )]
                      [ ( ) ( | ) ( ), ( ) ( | , ) ( )]
b c b c b
c b c
U X Y F a y U X b y c x U Y X d x
F c x U Y d x a y U X Y b y
Ψ = Ψ + Ψ +
= Ψ + Ψ +        (17) 
However, we will focus on the form provided by equation (16) as it simplifies the 
analysis and furthermore, as, we shall see, the utility functions obtained by this axiom 
are the basic building blocks for any general multiattribute utility function.  
The use of the pair of utility functions U X  and U Y  in the first line or the 
pair  and U Y in the second line of equation (16) poses the question of 
whether there are other combinations of for the functional form of (16). Tribus [4] 
posed a similar question for probability and sought the full range of exhaustive 
arguments of the functional equation (16). He showed that all but the two shown 
above lead to inconsistencies in logical thought. In an analogous form, Tribus’ work 
can apply to utility functions so we will not elaborate on the full details of his proof in 
this paper. However, as an example of the analogy with his conclusions, let us 
examine some alternative forms of equation (16).  
( )b ( | )c bX
( )cU Y ( | )c bX
We might suppose that  
 
( . | ) [ ( | ), ( | )b c b cU X Y F U X U YΨ = Ψ Ψ                          (18) 
 
be a permissible form. But we can show that no relation of this form could satisfy 
our qualitative conditions of the second axiom. The reason is that the level of attribute 
bX can have a very high preference given our state of preferences, Y  can also have a 
high preference given our state of preferences, however, the conjunction of both 
c
.b cX Y can still be highly preferred or not preferred at all. For example, we may have a 
high preference for listening to classical music, and we may also have a high 
preference for watching action movies, however, we may have a very little preference 
for doing both simultaneously. We would have no way of taking such conditional 
influences into account with a formula like (18).  
Associativity of the conjunction operation discussed earlier provides great 
consequences for the associativity of the function, , where it limits the range of 
functions it can take on.  
F
If we write equation (16) for the case of three attributes, we have 
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( . . | ) ( .( . ) | )
                        [ ( | ( . ), ), ( . | )]
                        [ ( | ( . ), ), [ ( | , ), ( | )]]
b c a b c a
b c a c a
b c a c a a
U X Y Z U X Y Z
F U X Y Z U Y Z
F U X Y Z F U Y Z U Z
Ψ = Ψ
= Ψ Ψ
= Ψ Ψ Ψ
Ψ
       (19) 
Alternatively, we can group the attributes in a different way to get 
 
 
( . . | ) (( . ). | )
                        [ (( . ) | , ), ( | )]
                        [ [ ( | , , ), ( | , )], ( | )]
b c a b c a
b c a a
b c a c a a
U X Y Z U X Y Z
F U X Y Z U Z




    (20) 
From the associativity of the conjunction, equations (19) and (20) must be equal so 
we have 
 
 [ , [ , ]] [ [ , ], ]F x F y z F F x y z=                                        (21) 
The functional equations (4) and (21) are analogous to Cox’s equations for 
probability, and have a unique non-trivial solution described by the following 
equations 
 
 ( | ) ( | )b bU X U X 1Ψ + Ψ∼ =
)
                                    (22) 
 
( . | ) ( | ). ( | ,
                    ( | ). ( | , )
b c b c b
c b c
U X Y U X U Y X
U Y U X Y
Ψ = Ψ Ψ
= Ψ Ψ                     (23) 
Equations (22) and (23) form the basis for the assignment of a utility function for 
the conjunction of two attributes. They are also sufficient to determine the utility 
function for any logical operation of attributes.  
The commutativity of the conjunction operator derived earlier, results in the two 
forms of equation (23) and allows for the expression 
 





U Y U X YU Y X
U X
Ψ ΨΨ = Ψ                     (24) 
Equation (24) forms the basis of utility inference and explains how the utility 
function over one attribute changes for different values of the others.  
We now define the condition of utility independence between attributes X and 
when the conditional utility function of Y X is independent of Y , or alternatively, the 
conditional utility function of Y is independent of X . I.e.  
 
 ( | , ) ( | )U X Y U XΨ = Ψ                                          (25) 
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Substituting equation (25) into equation (24), we find that this condition also 
implies 
 
( | , ) ( | )U Y X U YΨ = Ψ                                          (26) 
Equations (25)  and (26) show that utility independence is a symmetric relationship. 
Mathematical manipulations of equations (22) and (23), as well as the algebra of 
preferences, allows for the deduction of the utility of the disjunction of two attributes 
as follows. From equation (22) we have  
 




From equation (15) we have  
 
( ( ) | ) 1 (( ).( ) | )b c b cU X Y U X Y∨ Ψ = − Ψ∼ ∼                        (28) 
From equation (23), we have  
 
( | ) 1 ( | ) ( | , )
                       1 ( | )(1 ( | , ))
                       1 ( | ) ( . | )
                       ( | ) ( | ) ( | , )
                      
b c b c b
b c b
b b c
b c b c
U X Y U X U Y X
U X U Y X
U X U X Y
U X U Y U X Y
∨ Ψ = − Ψ Ψ
= − Ψ − Ψ
= − Ψ + Ψ





 ( | ) ( | )(1 ( | , )
                       ( | ) ( | ) ( . | )
b c b c
b c b c
U X U Y U X Y
U X U Y U X Y
= Ψ + Ψ −
= Ψ + Ψ − Ψ
               (29) 
Equation (29) provides a normative basis for assigning utility values for the 
disjunction of two attributes. An interesting observation we can deduce from (29) is 
that the disjunction of utility independent attributes has a multilinear form, which 
agrees with the multilinear utility function proposed in [5]. 
In the next section, we show how we can use the algebra of preferences and the 
rules of utility inference to model more general classes of multiattribute utility 
functions.  
 
  LOGICAL OPERATIONS ON ATRRIBUTES   
 
The construction of the utility value for the conjunction of two attributes provided 
by equation (16) assumes a value of zero when any one of the attributes is set at its 
minimum value. I.e. 
 
       (30) min min min max min max( , ) ( , ) 0     [ , ], [ ,U x y U x y x x x y y y= = ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈
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We previously defined this type of multiattribute utility functions, that is the 
conjunction of attributes, as Attribute Dominance Utility [6], [7], since any attribute 
set at a minimum value dominates the utility function and brings it to a minimum. 
In many cases that arise in practice, our preferences are described by more than just 
the conjunction of attributes. For example, we may be interested in the disjunction of 
attributes. One typical example may be the utility function for the success of a project 
as measured by levels of market share and/or revenue. Both of these attributes 
individually or combined may drive our preferences for the prospect. In this case we 
can use the algebra of prospects discussed earlier to construct a utility function as:  
 
( | ) ( | ) ( | ) ( . |c b c b c bU Y X U Y U X U Y X∨ Ψ = Ψ + Ψ − Ψ)                    (31) 
 
We can also use Bayes’ rule for utility inference in this case. For example,  
 
( . | ) ( . | ) ( . . | )( | , )
( | )
c a b a c b a
c b a
a
U Y Z U X Z U Y X ZU Y X Z
U Z
Ψ + Ψ −∨ Ψ = Ψ
Ψ           (32) 
The algebra of preferences assigned to utility functions allows us to think of our 
preferences more generally in terms of logical operations on the attributes rather than 
just their conjunction.   
In the following example, we show how the extension of attribute dominance 
utility, to include logical operations of attributes, explains many general formulations 
of classes of multiattribute utility functions.  
Example: Utility function for disjunction of attributes 
Let us consider a corporation that assigns a multiattribute utility function for profit. 
The attributes associated with the company’s utility function are profit in the first year 
of operation and profit in the second year. The company has an exponential utility 
function and is risk averse for the net present value of profit, with a risk aversion 
coefficient, γ .  
We can think of the construction of this utility function using the algebra of 
preferences that we have developed. If the company is only interested in profit, then 
its utility comes from either attribute x , or a discounted attribute , or both attributes 
conjoined together. The company’s utility is based on the disjunction of the two 
operators. Using the rules of the algebra of preferences, we have 
y
 
                 (33) ( | ) ( | ) ( | ) ( . |U x y U x U y U x y∨ Ψ = Ψ + Ψ − Ψ)
 
The conjunction of the two attributes U x( . | )y Ψ is their attribute dominance utility 
function and, for the case of exponential utility functions, is the product of the utility 
functions for each attribute (since the risk attitude does not depend on the wealth state, 
then the utility function for the second year profit is independent of the first). 
Therefore we can write equation (33) as 
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( | ) ( | ) ( | ) ( | ) ( |U x y U x U y U x U x∨ Ψ = Ψ + Ψ − Ψ Ψ)                (34) 
 
If the company is risk averse for profit and has an exponential utility function, then 
consistency of assigning utility functions requires the following utility functions for 
each of the attributes:  
 
 ( | ) 1 , 0xU x e xγ−Ψ = − ≥                                (35) 
( | ) 1 , 0yU y e xγβ−Ψ = − ≥                                (36) 
If we substitute the utility function for attributes x and from (35) and (36) into 
equation (34), we get 
y
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
( | ) (1 ) (1 ) (1 )(1 ),   , 0.
                   1 ,   , 0.
x y x y
x y
U x y e e e e x y
e x y
γ γ β γ γ β
γ β
− − − −
− +
∨ Ψ = − + − − − − ≥
= − ≥       (37) 
The results of the algebra of preferences provide a new framework for thinking 
about the utility values of different attributes. In fact, the prospects and values can be 
expressed in terms of more complicated operations but we note that the terms for all 
the logical expressions in the final multiattribute utility function can be determined 
from the attribute dominance utility function (the utility function for the conjunction). 
CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have introduced axioms of utility assignment and inference using 
an analogy with Cox’s axiomatic approach for probability.  We also developed the 
algebra of preferences, which describes the values in terms of logical operations on 
their attributes. The algebra of preferences, combined with the rules of utility 
inference, allows the construction of more general classes of multiattribute utility 
functions using logical identities as was demonstrated with the disjunction operation.  
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